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Abstract
Today’s smartphones feature several authentication
methods not only to protect the overall device but also
to control access to mobile banking and commerce
apps, for example. However, to date there is no
clear understanding on how users perceive different
authentication methods in light of different usage
contexts. To close this gap, we report on a study (N=22)
in which we compared four recent authentication
schemes on Android devices (Face Unlock, fingerprint
scanning, NFC ring and PIN) in four different mobile
settings (private vs. public, moving vs. stationary). We
found that Fingerprint scanning turned out to be a
well-suited and accepted authentication scheme over
all four investigated contexts. While the NFC-based
ring authentication is seen as less suitable for private
settings, Face Unlock is disliked for public settings.

1.

Introduction

As the most ubiquitous and personal devices in
history, smartphones contain and give access to a myriad
of private and sensitive information. They store vast
amounts of photos, contain e-mails, chat messages and
calendar entries, comprise long histories of visited Web
pages and let users interact with their social network.
Furthermore, installed sports and health trackers unveil
the owner’s physical condition, banking apps reveal
her financial status and respective m-commerce and
payment apps even enable costly online and offline
purchases.
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Figure 1. We compared four authentication schemes
for smartphones with regard to four mobile contexts:
face unlock, fingerprint scanning (left), NFC ring
unlock (right) and PIN (exemplary illustrations).

To prevent unwanted access, either in case we
shortly leave our phones unattended or, worse, the
phone is stolen, today’s smartphones offer a variety
of authentication schemes. These include traditional
ones such as entering a secret code, biometrics-based
schemes such as fingerprint scanning, as well as
token-based ones which check for the close vicinity of
a smart personal item. These methods can not only
be used to control access to the phone in general (i.e.,
its operating system) but are also increasingly applied
to protect privacy-critical applications such as mail,
banking or payment apps (either configurable by the
user or forced by the provider). On average, users
unlock their phones 50 times a day [1].
While prior work in the field of usable and
secure smartphone authentication suggests that one
single authentication scheme might not be practical
across different mobile contexts [2], research about
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how users perceive the use of particular currently
available authentication methods in different mobile
usage contexts is scarce. Yet, this practical knowledge
is valuable for interaction designers and developers
of both mobile apps and operating systems. For
example, researchers and practitioners can benefit from
recommendations on which authentication schemes are
suitable according to the type of app, or how to
customize a scheme according to the context.
To close this gap, we conducted a lab study with
22 participants. We compared four widely available
authentication schemes [3, 4] on Android devices: PINs,
fingerprint scanning (Figure 1, left), face unlock, and
NFC ring (Figure 1, right) and investigated their setup
procedures as well as their perceived comfort of use
and suitability in four different mobile settings (private
vs. public, moving vs. stationary). We discuss the
implications of the study results and provide suggestions
for practitioners and researchers.

We build on (1) smartphone authentication,
(2) usability and security trade-off, and (3)
context-dependent authentication.

that affect not only data security but even personal
safety. This highlights the importance of using secure
authentication schemes to protect users from shoulder
surfing, and prevent its negative consequences. Many
of today’s most commonly used authentication schemes
are vulnerable to shoulder surfing [16], thermal attacks
[17], and smudge attacks [18].
However, systems that are more secure yet less
usable are less likely to be used in practice. Harbach
et al. reported on the results of an online survey and a
field study in which they investigated users’ smartphone
unlocking behavior [1]. They found that users spend
2.9% of their interaction times authenticating, and
unlock their phones 47.8 times a day on average [1].
This underlines the need for fast authentication schemes,
since every additional second spent authenticating
accumulates to large amount of time. De Luca et
al. [19] conducted an online survey on the reasons for
using and not using biometric authentication systems
on smartphones and conclude that usability is a more
relevant decision factor than privacy or trust issues.
Harbach et al. [1] found that there are many contexts
in which users do not perceive the need for secure
authentication (e.g., at home), which motivates the need
for context-dependent authentication [20].

2.1.

2.3.

2.

Background and Related Work

Smartphone Authentication

Motivated by the need for privacy protection on
mobile devices [5], research in Mobile HCI brought
forth a variety of authentication schemes. They can
be generally classified to 1) Knowledge-based schemes
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10], where the user has to know something
(e.g., PIN or pattern) to unlock, 2) Possesion-based
schemes [11, 12], where the user has to posses a
token (e.g., NFC ring, or personal mobile device), 3)
Inherence-based schemes or biometric schemes [13, 14],
which rely on biometric data such as fingerprint, eyes
behavior, face detection etc. In our work, we investigate
how the context influences the users’ perception of these
different authentication factors.

2.2.

Usability and Security Trade-off

It is widely accepted that security is usually a
secondary rather than a primary goal for users when
performing daily tasks [15]. Harbach et al. found
that users do not perceive shoulder surfing as a risk
[1]. Eiband et al. explained this when they found
that shoulder surfing does occur in the real world, but
often goes unnoticed [16]. Eiband et al. also found
that authentication credential (e.g., PINs and patterns)
are among the data often shoulder surfed, and that
there could be serious consequences to shoulder surfing

Context-dependent Authentication

Several solutions from research and industry exploit
knowledge about the user’s context to enhance the
user authentication experience. Prior works proposed
using the location of the user to decide which
security measures to take [21, 20, 22]. For example,
many systems (e.g., banking apps and Facebook) ask
additional questions when logging in using an unusual
IP, and Google’s Smart Lock1 does not lock the screen
when the user is at home. Due to the trade-off
between usability and security, these schemes often
offer more security at the expense of lower usability.
For example, multiple authentication systems, such as
GazeTouchPIN [23] and SwiPIN [9], were proposed
with the intention to be used only when resistance to
shoulder surfing is needed, since they are slightly slower
than their less secure counterparts. SnappApp uses
PIN for secure access, and a sliding gesture for fast
access; the fast access mode restricts the apps that can be
launched and has a time limit [24]. Furthermore, there
are apps on the Google Play store that assign different
lock mechanisms for each mobile application [25, 26].
We build over prior work by contributing practical
insights into the perception of widely available mobile
authentication schemes in typical mobile contexts.
1 https://get.google.com/smartlock/
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3.

Method

In this section, we describe our study method and
present details on the participants, the investigated
authentication schemes, and the study setup and design.

3.1.

Participants

The call for participation in the study was distributed
by the authors via social media and emails to direct
personal contacts with the request to further distribute
the call. As a precondition, potential participants had
to own their smartphone for at least half a year and use
it multiple times a day. We applied a nonprobabilistic
sampling, yet carefully selected interested ones with
varying working (students, young and experienced
professionals) and educational (apprentices, students,
graduates, practitioners) backgrounds. Out of the finally
chosen 24 participants, we had to exclude two for
the actual study due to problems with the fingerprint
scanner: Both were chemistry students and stated that
they often had issues with fingerprint scanners due to
minor corrosive injuries at their fingers from acidic
substances. 13 of the final participants were female,
nine male. The subjects were aged between 20 and 54
years (M=27.05, MD=25.00). 17 participants owned
a smartphone for over three years, three for two to
three years and two participants one to two years. Six
of the participants used smartphones with iOS and 16
with Android. Five of the 22 participants did not have
German as their native language but considered their
German language skills sufficient for the study. They
were offered to set the phone to their native language
but refused.

3.2.

Authentication Schemes

For comparison, we selected four authentication
schemes due to their wide availability and, in case of
the NFC ring, due to their novelty. Note that we used
Android devices, i.e. the following descriptions refer to
the respective Android implementations.
Android Face Unlock (in the remainder simply
referred to as Face Unlock) uses facial image
recognition. For authentication, a photo of the current
user’s face taken by the front camera is compared to
one or several photos locally stored during setup. This
feature has been available on Android smartphones since
Android 5.0 (published in 2014). At its publication
time, Face Unlock was the first widely available face
recognition software that could be used on smartphones
for authentication purposes.
Although it can be
bypassed with a photo of the smartphone owner, it is still
available on current Android smartphones. However,

during setup the user is informed about this security risk.
Fingerprint scanning has been introduced for
mobiles by the Toshiba G500 and G700 in 2007.
However, the authentication scheme gained popularity
mostly because of Touch ID, Apple’s brand and
implementation of fingerprint authentication introduced
with the iPhone 5s in 2013. Sporadic Android devices
featured fingerprint scanners before, yet fingerprint
recognition became part of the standard platform (and
thus could be used by third-party apps) with Android
6.0 in 2015. Similar to Face Unlock, during an
authentication attempt the scanned data is compared
with a locally stored version of the fingerprint.
The NFC ring, worn on a finger, is an example for
a recent token-based authentication scheme relying on a
smart personal item. Near Field Communication (NFC)
is a wireless short-range communication technology.
Respective rings contain so-called NFC tags which
can be detected by the NFC sensors integrated on
the backside of most modern smartphones. Thus, for
authentication the ring needs to be placed in front
of the sensor. Again, the identifier of the scanned
tag is compared with the one configured during setup.
In contrast to similar authentication methods using
Bluetooth technology (to detect a trusted smartwatch,
for example) with a range of dozens of meters,
NFC-based authentication only works within a few
centimeters. Respective rings and a corresponding
authentication app are available from McLear 2 since
2016, for example.
PIN (Personal Identification Number),
a
multi-digit passcode, is a traditional knowledge-based
authentication method. It is typically used at ATMs for
debit and credit cards or for physical access control. On
mobile phones PINs have been available since the early
beginnings, to protect SIM card access, for example. To
unlock the smartphone the user has to enter a number,
usually consisting of at least four digits. Again, for a
successful authentication the entered PIN must match
the previously defined one.

3.3.

Setup

The study was conducted in two separate adjacent
test rooms. We prepared two recent mass-market
smartphones from Sony, a Sony Xperia X and a Sony
Xperia Z3 Compact. Both were running Android in
version 7.
For the NFC Ring Unlock method we provided
the model “Signature” by McLear Ltd. and installed
the corresponding mobile application in version 1.7.3.
This application was also the reason for using two
2 https://nfcring.com/
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smartphones: it does not replace the original Android
unlock screen but adds another authentication layer that
becomes visible only after the user has successfully
unlocked the phone. To be able to correctly compare
the investigated authentication methods in terms of
speed and usage comfort, the ring unlock was used
on a separate phone without any additional “on-board”
authentication.
On the other smartphone, the test assistant who
conducted the study, switched between the fingerprint
scanner, the PIN and the Face Unlock during the study.

3.4.

Study Design

We invited the participants in groups of four to
six persons (five test sessions overall). The groups
deliberately consisted of persons who did not know each
other. Each of the test sessions started with a briefing
on the topic and the study outline by the test assistant
and a short questionnaire gathering demographic data
and prior experience (knowledge and usage of the
investigated authentication methods, for example).
Then, each test person, one by one, was asked to
initially set up the authentication methods in a separate
room. The order of the four methods was systematically
varied following a Latin square to avoid any learning
or preference effects. For each method, the present
test assistant clocked the time it took the participants to
successfully set up the scheme. After the final method,
the participants were asked to rank the four methods in
terms of setup complexity, i.e. to assign the numbers 1
(worst) to 4 (best) to the four schemes.
In the second test phase, the test assistant asked the
participants to explore the four authentication schemes
and unlock the phones several times in four different
contexts (again, orders were systematically varied):
• Moving - Private: Each participant explored the
methods in a separate room while walking.
• Moving - Public: Each participant explored the
methods in the room with the other participants
while walking.
• Stationary - Private: Each participant explored
the methods in a separate room while sitting.
• Stationary - Public: Each participant explored
the methods in the room with the other
participants while sitting next to them.
In all study settings, the test assistant was present
and made notes about observations and comments
of the respective participant. Having tested each
authentication method in one context, the participants

were asked to rank them in terms of the comfort of use
in the specific context. Having completed all contexts,
the participants ranked the methods with regard to
the perceived suitability of each method for a public,
private, moving and stationary setting.

4.

Results

In the following, we present the quantitative and
qualitative results of our study. To test for significant
differences (p<.05), we ran ANOVA tests. For post-hoc
pairwise comparisons we used Bonferroni corrected
confidence intervals. Error bars in the figures indicate
the standard error.
Concerning prior knowledge and experience, 21
participants knew the PIN method, 19 had used it at
least once. 18 participants knew fingerprint scanning,
6 had used it themselves on their smartphone. Face
Unlock and NFC-based unlocking were known by three
participants, respectively. Yet, none of the participants
had used one of those two methods before.

4.1.

Setup Duration and Complexity

Figure 2 (left) shows the average duration for
setting up the four authentication methods.
Our
participants were fastest with the PIN method
(M=45.18s, SD=15.08s), followed by the fingerprint
scanner (M=66.55s, SD=23.45s) and the Face Unlock
(M=69.59s, SD=18.71s). Setting up the NFC ring
unlock took the most time (M=76.45s, SD=16.40s).
The post-hoc pairwise tests show that the setup of
the PIN method is significantly faster that the studied
alternatives (p<.001).
This outcome correlates with the perceived setup
complexity (Figure 2, right): the setup of the PIN
method was rated simpler than the alternatives (M=3.77,
SD=.61). The setup of the fingerprint scanner was
ranked second-simplest (M=2.32, SD=.84) followed by
the one of the Face Unlock (M=2.10, SD=.92). The
setup of the NFC ring unlock method was rated as most
complex (M=1.82, SD=.96). Again, the result of the
PIN method differs significantly from the three other
authentication schemes (p<.001).

4.2.

Comfort of Use

Figure 3 shows the results of the participants’
rankings regarding the comfort of use grouped by the
investigated mobile contexts. The fingerprint scanner
received the highest ratings (M between 3.23 and 3.45)
in each context. Pairwise post-hoc tests reveal that its
use is perceived as significantly more comfortable than
the Face Unlock and the NFC ring unlock in all mobile
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Setup Duration

Ranking Setup Complexity
4

80.00

3.5

70.00
60.00

3

50.00
40.00

2.5

30.00

2

20.00
1.5

10.00
0.00

1

Face Unlock

Fingerprint Scanner

NFC Ring

PIN

4.00

Figure 2. A comparison of the initial setup of the
four authentication methods: the average setup
3.00
duration in seconds (left) and the perceived setup
2.50
complexity (1-worst to 4-best) (right).
3.50

2.00

Ranking Comfort of Use

1.50
4.00
1.00
3.50

Moving-Private

3.00

Moving-Public

For private settings there is no clear favorite: Face
Unlock, fingerprint scanning and PIN received similar
ratings with non-significant differences. Yet, the NFC
unlock ring (M=1.59, SD=.73) was ranked significantly
worse than the other methods (p<.003).
When moving, the participants again ranked the
fingerprint scanner (M=3.68, SD=.71) significantly
better than
the rest
(p<.001)
the PIN
Face Unlock
Fingerprint
Scanner and
NFC Ring
PIN method
Unlock
Fingerprint Scanner
Ring
PIN
(M=2.64, Face
SD=.79)
significantly
betterNFCthan
Face
Unlock
and the NFC ring (p<.03).
For the “stationary” scenario, our participants rated
the suitability of fingerprint scanning (M=3.14, SD=.99)
significantly better than the suitability of the NFC ring
(p<.001). Also Face Unlock (M=2.5, SD=1.26) and
PIN (M=2.72, SD=.94) were perceived significantly
more suitable than the NFC ring for this scenario
(p<.03).

Stationary-Private Stationary-Public
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Figure 3. Ranking of the perceived comfort of the
Public
Private
Stationary
Stationary
four authentication methods in four mobile contexts.

contexts (p<.01).
The PIN method was ranked second-best in all
contexts in terms of the comfort of use (M between 2.50
and 2.86), was rated significantly better (p<.03) than
the NFC ring unlock in each context but ’Stationary
- Public’. Lowest scores regarding comfort of use
received Face Unlock (M between 2.00 and 2.41) and
NFC ring unlock (M between 1.68 and 1.95).
Comparing the comfort of use over different
contexts, we observe the same order of authentication
methods.

4.3.

Suitability for Contexts

Figure 4 shows the summary of how our participants
ranked the suitability of the four authentication methods
for the mobile contexts public, private, moving and
stationary.
For public settings, the participants ranked the
fingerprint scanner (M=3.72, SD=.63) significantly
better than the alternatives (p<.001). The NFC ring
and PIN were rated second with similar results. Face
Unlock was rated significantly worse than the other
authentication schemes (p<.02) for this scenario.

Face Unlock

Private

Moving

Fingerprint Scanner

NFC Ring

Stationary
PIN

Figure 4. The perceived suitability of the four
authentication methods for four mobile contexts:
public, private, moving and stationary.

4.4.

Observations and Participants’
Comments

In this section, we summarize qualitative findings
from observations during the study as well as verbal
comments from participants.
Face Unlock caused the most problems during
setup. Only six out of the 22 participants were able
to find the corresponding option in the settings menu
without any help from the test assistant. A majority
of the participants stated that this feature and its setup
was unnecessarily hidden and circuitous. Moreover,
participants complained about the minimalistic user
feedback during unlock. A successful face scan is only
communicated by a small icon transforming into an
open lock. A “swipe to unlock” gesture is still required
to leave the lock screen.
Eleven participants had negative remarks regarding
the actual face scanning (“it feels like I’m taking
selfies”, “holding up the phone is exhausting”, “this is
unpleasant to use in public”).
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Nine participants mentioned the performance (speed
and recognition rate) of Android’s Face Unlock in a
positive light and considered it as a “fancy” technology.
Setting up fingerprint scanning was difficult for
seven participants. The prompts used in the setup
screens turned out to be ambiguous, leaving many
participants puzzled about how to correctly move the
finger over the sensor.
The majority of the participants had very positive
remarks for its use (“very quick and simple”, “ideal
to unlock the smartphone in an unnoticeable way”,
“you always have your finger with you”). Often
the smartphone was unlocked so quickly that the
participants did not notice that it already happened
and asked whether they unintentionally removed all the
previously set up unlock methods.
NFC Ring Unlock was perceived very differently
by participants. Positive statements included that the
NFC Ring Unlock method is something new and thus
interesting. On the opposite, many of the participants
claimed that they do not like rings in general or that the
used ring was not stylish enough.
Two participants stated that the ring requires direct
contact to the NFC sensor (instead of one or two
centimeters range) and that this fact makes a lot of
difference for the usability of the technology. One
tech-savvy participant additionally commented that
support from the operating system would be better than
the currently used additional application for detecting
the ring.
Most participants mentioned that they liked the idea,
however, that it takes time to accustom oneself to the
correct usage. Furthermore, they noticed that such an
item could be lost or forgotten easily or shift its position
on the finger.
PIN entry caused no noticeable problems for the
participants during setup. Although it was not specified,
all the participants chose a four-digit PIN. Most of
the participants stated that they are used to it and
that they use PINs frequently in various contexts.
Two participants stated that they prefer other methods
over PIN because they are afraid of shoulder surfing
attacks.
A few participants commented that this
authentication method required the most interaction
with the smartphone.

5.

Discussion

In our study, the traditional PIN outperformed the
three more recent alternatives in both setup duration
and perceived setup complexity. We ascribe this to
the facts, that the PIN method is very well-known, the
setup process is straight-forward and does not involve

any ambiguous steps as well as the vast majority is
familiar with entering PINs. With regard to the setup,
the three other investigated authentication schemes
performed similarly poor. In most cases, the reasons
were usability issues (corresponding option cannot be
found, ambiguous prompts, etc.). We conclude from
this findings, that app developers should rather avoid
forcing users to use a previously not configured modern
authentication scheme such as fingerprint scanning,
Face Unlock or NFC-based authentication. Problems
during setup might affect a user’s overall experience of
the third-party app.
Regarding the comfort of use, it turned out that the
users’ perception of the respective authentication
schemes is very similar in different contexts,
i.e. the mobile context does not significantly impact
the perceived comfort of use.
The investigated
authentication schemes seem technically mature, the
comfort of Face Unlock was not negatively affected in
the moving scenarios, for example. Our participants
favored fingerprint scanning: Once configured, current
fingerprint scanning worked very fast and highly
robust. We ascribe the low rankings of Face Unlock
and the NFC ring to the insufficient user feedback and
the unnatural hand and finger placement to correctly
position the ring in front of the NFC sensor, respectively.
Concerning the suitability for different contexts,
Face Unlock was perceived as least suitable in public
settings. From the participants’ remarks we learned
that they felt exposed and thought to arouse attention
due to the camera-based detection. This result of
our “hands-on” study confirms findings from the
online survey by De Luca et al. [19], who report on
awkwardness when using Face Unlock in public. We
therefore do not recommend Android Face Unlock for
protecting apps typically used in public such as payment
apps in a queue at the checkout.
Fingerprint had a high suitability score in each
context and therefore, can be recommended for apps
typically used in all of the four investigated scenarios.
According to our participants it works fast and (due to
the fingerprint reader mounted at backside of the phone)
can be easily integrated into the typical handling of
the phone when taking it out of a bag, for example.
Remarkable are the high scores in public settings
and moving context, which qualifies it especially for
payment apps or running and fitness tracker apps.
NFC ring had rather low suitability scores in all
contexts and received its best rating for public settings.
As reason, we assume that after some training during the
setup phase, the users were able to authenticate with the
ring rather unobtrusively (in contrast to Face Unlock, for
example) what is an appreciated attribute of smartphone
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authentication schemes. However, we conclude that
NFC-based authentication using a small external token
which can be easily lost or forgotten, is not appreciated
for mobile contexts at all.
The suitability of the PIN method was perceived
as similarly good in all investigated scenarios, yet
always received lower scores than fingerprint scanning.
We therefore recommend it as a general well-accepted
authentication scheme and, in case an application
already applies fingerprint scanning, as a suitable
back-up solution.

6.

Limitations

In the present study, we focused on the users’
perception of the studied authentication methods.
We deliberately ignored any security aspects, either
subjective or objective, and performance aspects such
as error rates of the discussed methods.
We tried our best to mimic the “public setting”
in a controllable environment by having multiple
unknown persons present during the test of a participant.
However, we assume, yet cannot guarantee that this
situation conveyed a truly realistic impression of a
public setting such as in a busy shop, for example.
Again, we emphasize that the study participants used
Android devices. Therefore, the results do not demand
for cross-platform generalization. This is especially
important for the biometrics-based authentication
schemes. For example, on Apple devices the fingerprint
sensors are integrated into the front (in contrast to
the study devices with fingerprint sensors at the back
side). Moreover, Apple’s facial recognition system
Face ID is based on infrared technology and thus
might perform and thus be experienced differently in
respective comparative studies.

7.

Conclusion and Outlook

We presented a comparative lab study investigating
users’ perceived comfort of use and suitability of
four recent smartphone authentication methods in four
different mobile contexts. Our results indicate that the
four investigated contexts do not affect the experienced
comfort of use of the investigated method. Yet,
we learned that users assess the methods’ suitability
differently across various contexts.
Face Unlock
is disliked for public settings, while the NFC-based
ring authentication is seen as less suitable for private
settings. Fingerprint scanning turned out to be a
well-suited and accepted authentication scheme over all
four investigated contexts.
Furthermore, we found that setting up the biometric

authentication schemes in Android is difficult for
many users. Usability flaws include insufficient user
feedback, ambiguous prompts and hard to find menu
items. Third-party app developers should consider these
obstacles when suggesting a respective authentication
scheme or even forcing users to initially configure
fingerprint scanning or Face Unlock.
Follow-up studies should try to validate
the presented findings in the field (e.g., using
the participants’ personal devices and mobile
questionnaires, e.g.) to proof the ecological validity
of our results. Additionally, such a field study should
investigate long-term effects (e.g., how the perceived
usability of a recent authentication scheme such as the
NFC ring) changes over time.
Prospective in-depth studies could further explore
potential factors (such as the form factor and
appearance of a token-based mobile authentication
scheme) impacting the comfort of use and the perceived
suitability. For example, a nice-looking ring might
be preferred over less pretty one in public settings.
Furthermore, future studies could focus on the users’
authentication experiences of app categories with
different security or privacy requirements.
Finally, future studies should consider further
methods and platforms. Especially, the most recent
mobile authentication scheme available on mass market
phones, Apple’s Face ID should be compared to
former face unlock implementations. An advanced
implementation with a more tolerant recognition might
make this authentication method less noticeable and
more suitable for public settings.
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A. Ben-Oved, and S. Möller, “On the need for
different security methods on mobile phones,” in
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Human Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and
Services, MobileHCI ’11, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 465–473, ACM, 2011.
[6] A. De Luca, M. Harbach, E. von Zezschwitz, M.-E.
Maurer, B. E. Slawik, H. Hussmann, and M. Smith,
“Now you see me, now you don’t: Protecting smartphone
authentication from shoulder surfers,” in Proceedings of
the 32Nd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, CHI ’14, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 2937–2946, ACM, 2014.
[7] J. Gugenheimer, A. De Luca, H. Hess, S. Karg,
D. Wolf, and E. Rukzio, “Colorsnakes: Using colored
decoys to secure authentication in sensitive contexts,”
in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference
on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices
and Services, MobileHCI ’15, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 274–283, ACM, 2015.
[8] M. Khamis, F. Alt, M. Hassib, E. von Zezschwitz,
R. Hasholzner, and A. Bulling, “Gazetouchpass:
Multimodal authentication using gaze and touch on
mobile devices,” in Proceedings of the 2016 CHI
Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, CHI EA ’16, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 2156–2164, ACM, 2016.
[9] E. von Zezschwitz, A. De Luca, B. Brunkow, and
H. Hussmann, “Swipin: Fast and secure pin-entry on
smartphones,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
CHI ’15, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 1403–1406, ACM,
2015.
[10] Y. Yang, G. D. Clark, J. Lindqvist, and A. Oulasvirta,
“Free-form gesture authentication in the wild,” in
Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’16, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 3722–3735, ACM, 2016.
[11] M. Khamis, R. Hasholzner, A. Bulling, and F. Alt,
“Gtmopass:
Two-factor authentication on public
displays using gaze-touch passwords and personal
mobile devices,” in Proceedings of the 6th ACM
International Symposium on Pervasive Displays, PerDis
’17, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 8:1–8:9, ACM, 2017.
[12] F. Schaub, P. Lang, B. Könings, and M. Weber,
“Prical: Dynamic privacy adaptation of collaborative
calendar displays,” in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing
Adjunct Publication, UbiComp ’13 Adjunct, (New York,
NY, USA), pp. 223–226, ACM, 2013.
[13] A. De Luca, A. Hang, F. Brudy, C. Lindner, and
H. Hussmann, “Touch me once and i know it’s you!:
Implicit authentication based on touch screen patterns,”
in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’12, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 987–996, ACM, 2012.
[14] C. Song, A. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Xu, “”eyeveri:
A secure and usable approach for smartphone user
authentication”,” in IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communication (INFOCOM’16), (San
Francisco, California), pp. 1 – 9, April 2016.

[15] M. A. Sasse, S. Brostoff, and D. Weirich, “Transforming
the ‘weakest link’ — a human/computer interaction
approach to usable and effective security,” BT
Technology Journal, vol. 19, pp. 122–131, Jul 2001.
[16] M. Eiband, M. Khamis, E. von Zezschwitz,
H. Hussmann, and F. Alt, “Understanding shoulder
surfing in the wild: Stories from users and observers,”
in Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’17, (New York,
NY, USA), pp. 4254–4265, ACM, 2017.
[17] Y. Abdelrahman, M. Khamis, S. Schneegass, and
F. Alt, “Stay cool! understanding thermal attacks
on mobile-based user authentication,” in Proceedings
of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, CHI ’17, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 3751–3763, ACM, 2017.
[18] A. J. Aviv, K. Gibson, E. Mossop, M. Blaze, and
J. M. Smith, “Smudge attacks on smartphone touch
screens,” in Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference
on Offensive Technologies, WOOT’10, (Berkeley, CA,
USA), pp. 1–7, USENIX Association, 2010.
[19] A. De Luca, A. Hang, E. von Zezschwitz, and
H. Hussmann, “I feel like i’m taking selfies all day!:
Towards understanding biometric authentication on
smartphones,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
CHI ’15, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 1411–1414, ACM,
2015.
[20] E. Hayashi, S. Das, S. Amini, J. Hong, and I. Oakley,
“Casa: Context-aware scalable authentication,” in
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security, SOUPS ’13, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 3:1–3:10, ACM, 2013.
[21] A. Gupta, M. Miettinen, N. Asokan, and M. Nagy,
“Intuitive security policy configuration in mobile
devices using context profiling,” in 2012 International
Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust and
2012 International Confernece on Social Computing,
pp. 471–480, Sept 2012.
[22] N. Micallef, M. Just, L. Baillie, M. Halvey, and
H. G. Kayacik, “Why aren’t users using protection?
investigating the usability of smartphone locking,” in
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and
Services, MobileHCI ’15, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 284–294, ACM, 2015.
[23] M. Khamis, M. Hassib, E. v. Zezschwitz, A. Bulling,
and F. Alt, “Gazetouchpin:
Protecting sensitive
data on mobile devices using secure multimodal
authentication,” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM
International Conference on Multimodal Interaction,
ICMI 2017, (New York, NY, USA), ACM, 2017.
[24] D. Buschek, F. Hartmann, E. von Zezschwitz,
A. De Luca, and F. Alt, “Snapapp: Reducing
authentication overhead with a time-constrained
fast unlock option,” in Proceedings of the 2016 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
CHI ’16, (New York, NY, USA), ACM, 2016.
[25] burakgon,
“App locker — best applock.”
Website, 2018.
Retrieved June 4, 2018 from
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.martianmode.applock.
[26] D. Lab, “App lock.” Website, 2018. Retrieved June 4,
2018 from https://play.google.com/store/
apps/details?id=com.domobile.applock.

Page 4812

